## Stopping BOT-enabled cyber attacks through behavioral biometrics.



#### **WEBINAR SERIES**





 $2x + 4 \, \mathrm{d}x = 3x^3 + x^2 + 4x + C$ 

## MFA credentials that kill BOIS.

$$\tilde{U}(\tau,\omega) = \frac{1}{\Lambda(\tau,\omega)} \exp \left| i \int_{0}^{\tau} \left( \frac{\omega}{\omega_h} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}q(\tau)} \right|^{\frac{1}{2}}$$

 $\beta(\tau,\omega) = \exp\left[-\int_{0}^{\tau} \frac{\omega}{2q(\tau')} \left(\frac{\omega}{\omega_{h}}\right)\right]$ 

 $\Lambda(\tau,\omega) = \frac{\beta(\tau,\omega) + \sigma^2}{\left(\beta(\tau,\omega)\right)^2 + \sigma^2}$ 




PROBLEM

Stolen, shared and compromised passwords and digital credentials cost corporations billions of dollars in lost revenues each year.



About 66 results (0.30 seconds)



A message on Uber's internal system on Thursday told employees, "I announce I am a hacker and Uber has suffered a data breach." Jeff Chiu/Associated Press

#### The New York Times

Biden's Forgiveness Program Challenges Reach Supreme Court Income-Driven Repayment Propo

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	D Entity.h				
				+ Level.h + Level ::	

#### **SBilions in** costs and losses

PROBLEM

**Credential sharing** Identity theft or takeover **Ransomware attacks** eCommerce fraud Internet robot attacks Privacy management **Regulatory enforcement** 



#### **Multifactor Authentication**

**SNOT** 

...a complete solution.

PROBLEM

#### Conventional passwords and physical biometric factors are regularly:

Shared Stolen Replicated Compromised

00





#### What if we could "plug" the MFA BOT loophole?

What could we do with credentials that can't be shared, stolen, replicated by any human or machine?



#### What is a BOT attack?



#### What is a BOT attack?

The use of a script that mimics basic human behavior, whereby computers using "designer" code, stuff password challenge windows with a large volume of username and password combinations, in order to access protected "data".





#### What is a BOT attack?

#### The most common visualization is the login page of a "SaaS" provider.

The BOT has a login, and repeatedly guesses a password.

#### **AWESOME SaaS COMPANY USER NAME** boomer@aol.com PASSWORD dob\_and\_petname ACCESS





#### What are common types?



- Scraping
- Denial of Service (DDoS)
- Account Takeover (ATOs)
- Transactional Fraud







- Scraping
- Denial of Service (DDoS)
- Account Takeover (ATOs)
- Transactional Fraud
















The BOT reads (scrapes) all of the code on web-pages to gather all the information that they will need for a later malicious attack.

These happen all the time and are usually coordinated by several BOT farms.











- Scraping
- Denial of Service (DDoS)
- Account Takeover (ATOs)
- Transactional Fraud



## 503!



A BOT or group of BOTs act to block access to a property, overwhelming its ability to handle the multitude of concurrent or consecutive requests.

These were popular in the early 2000's and still take place today. They can bring any web dependent business to a halt.










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- Scraping
- Denial of Service (DDoS)
- Account Takeover (ATOs)
- Transactional Fraud





A user name has been stolen, and the BOT is left to guess the password using educated guesses from data obtained in other scraping or identity theft events.


This is persistent in nature and can go on for days until successful.







- Scraping
- Denial of Service (DDoS)
- Account Takeover (ATOs)
- Transactional Fraud





A BOT uses sensitive information in multiple web locations / services at the same time to mathematically guess a numeric combination.

Based on limited number of permutations of a simple three or four digit code.



#### ATOs and Transactional BOT attacks



#### **ATO and Transactional BOT attacks**

Depend largely on

- Predictability of use
  - User patterns
  - Number of characters and input choice
- Input mechanics
  - Available character choices
  - Standard "CAPTCHA" like systems
- A compromised data element
  - Login name
  - Some PII element



- Birthday dates in a password
- HS / College graduation year
- Use of 2 or 3 initials
- Year of birth in user name
- Year the account was opened
- 26 letters, 10 digits, and 33 specials characters
- Standard reCAPTCHA / CAPTCHA
- 4 digit PINs

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
## **Repetition predictability**

Character	Binary Code	Character	Binary Code	Character	Binary Code	Character	Binary Code	Character	Binary
Α	01000001	Q	01010001	g	01100111	w	01110111	-	0010
В	01000010	R	01010010	h	01101000	x	01111000		0010
c	01000011	S	01010011	i	01101001	Y	01111001	/	0010
D	01000100	т	01010100	j	01101010	z	01111010	0	0011
E	01000101	U	01010101	k	01101011	!	00100001	1	0011
F	01000110	v	01010110	I	01101100		00100010	2	0011
G	01000111	w	01010111	m	01101101	#	00100011	3	0011
н	01001000	X	01011000	n	01101110	\$	00100100	4	0011
I	01001001	Y	01011001	0	01101111	%	00100101	5	0011
J	01001010	z	01011010	P	01110000	8.	00100110	6	0011
ĸ	01001011	а	01100001	q	01110001		00100111	7	0011
L	01001100	b	01100010	r	01110010	(	00101000	8	0011
M	01001101	с	01100011	S	01110011	)	00101001	9	0011
N	01001110	d	01100100	t	01110100	*	00101010	?	0011
0	01001111	е	01100101	u	01110101	+	00101011	0	0100
P	01010000	f	01100110	v	01110110	,	00101100	-	0101
	A B C D E F G H I J K L N N O	A     01000001       B     01000010       C     01000011       D     01000100       E     01000101       F     01000111       G     01000111       H     010001001       J     010010001       K     01001001       K     01001010       M     01001011       L     01001101       N     01001101       O     01001101	A     01000001     Q       B     01000010     R       C     01000011     S       D     01000100     T       E     01000101     U       F     01000110     V       G     01000111     W       H     01001000     X       I     01001000     X       J     01001001     Y       J     01001001     Z       K     01001010     Z       M     01001101     c       N     01001101     c       N     01001101     c       N     01001101     c	A     01000001     Q     01010001       B     01000010     R     01010010       C     01000011     S     01010011       D     01000100     T     01010001       E     01000100     T     01010100       F     01000110     V     010101010       G     01000111     W     010101011       H     01001000     X     0101010111       H     01001000     X     010110000       I     01001001     Y     010110001       J     01001001     Z     010110001       K     01001010     Z     01001001       M     01001101     a     01100001       M     01001101     c     01100010       M     01001101     d     011000101       O     01001110     d     01100010       M     01001110     d     011000101       O     010011101     e     011000101       O     010011101     e <td>A     01000001     Q     01010001     g       B     01000010     R     01010010     h       C     01000011     S     01010011     i       D     01000100     T     01010001     j       E     01000100     T     01010100     j       F     01000101     U     01010101     k       G     01000110     V     01010101     k       H     01001000     X     01011000     n       J     01001001     Y     01011001     p       K     01001001     Y     01011001     p       K     01001010     Z     01011001     p       K     01001010     D     01100001     q       M     01001101     c     01100010     r       N     01001101     d     01100010     t       O     01001110     d     01100010     t       O     01001110     d     01100010     t <!--</td--><td>A     01000001     Q     01010001     g     01100111       B     01000010     R     01010010     h     01101000       C     01000010     T     01010011     i     01101000       D     01000100     T     01010100     j     01101001       E     01000101     U     01010101     k     01101010       F     01000110     V     01010101     k     01101010       G     01000111     W     01010101     I     01101010       H     01001000     X     01011000     m     01101101       H     01001001     Y     01011001     m     01101101       J     01001001     Z     01011001     p     01100101       J     01001010     Z     01010001     r     0110000       K     01001101     b     01100001     r     01110000       M     01001101     c     01100010     r     01110010       M     010</td><td>A     01000001     Q     01010001     g     01100111     w       B     01000010     R     01010010     h     01101000     x       C     01000011     S     01010011     i     01101000     x       D     01000100     T     01010010     j     01101001     y       E     01000101     U     01010101     k     01101000     z       F     01000101     V     01010101     k     01101101     z       G     01000111     W     010101011     m     01101100     "       H     01001000     X     01011000     N     01101101     #       H     01001001     Y     01011000     n     01101101     #       J     01001001     Z     01011001     O     01101111     %       J     0100101     Z     01011000     R     01100000     %       L     01001010     D     011000010     r     011100001&lt;</td><td>A     01000001     Q     01010001     g     01100111     w     01110111       B     01000010     R     01010010     h     01101000     x     01110101       C     01000011     S     01010011     i     01101000     y     01111000       D     01000100     T     01010100     j     01101001     y     01111001       E     01000101     U     01010100     k     01101010     z     01111000       F     01000100     V     010101010     k     01101101     i     00100001       G     01000100     X     010101010     I     01101100     i     00100001       F     01000100     X     01011000     n     01101101     #     00100001       G     01001001     Z     01011000     n     01101101     #     00100001       H     01001001     Z     01010001     p     01110000     %     00100101       J     01001010<td>A     01000001     Q     01010001     g     01100111     w     01110111     -       B     01000010     R     01010010     h     01101000     x     01111000     .       C     01000100     T     01010100     j     01101001     x     01111000     .       D     01000100     T     01010100     j     01101010     y     01111000     .       E     01000101     U     01010101     k     01101011     j     01101001     j     01001001     j     01000101     j     001000101     j     001001</td></td></td>	A     01000001     Q     01010001     g       B     01000010     R     01010010     h       C     01000011     S     01010011     i       D     01000100     T     01010001     j       E     01000100     T     01010100     j       F     01000101     U     01010101     k       G     01000110     V     01010101     k       H     01001000     X     01011000     n       J     01001001     Y     01011001     p       K     01001001     Y     01011001     p       K     01001010     Z     01011001     p       K     01001010     D     01100001     q       M     01001101     c     01100010     r       N     01001101     d     01100010     t       O     01001110     d     01100010     t       O     01001110     d     01100010     t </td <td>A     01000001     Q     01010001     g     01100111       B     01000010     R     01010010     h     01101000       C     01000010     T     01010011     i     01101000       D     01000100     T     01010100     j     01101001       E     01000101     U     01010101     k     01101010       F     01000110     V     01010101     k     01101010       G     01000111     W     01010101     I     01101010       H     01001000     X     01011000     m     01101101       H     01001001     Y     01011001     m     01101101       J     01001001     Z     01011001     p     01100101       J     01001010     Z     01010001     r     0110000       K     01001101     b     01100001     r     01110000       M     01001101     c     01100010     r     01110010       M     010</td> <td>A     01000001     Q     01010001     g     01100111     w       B     01000010     R     01010010     h     01101000     x       C     01000011     S     01010011     i     01101000     x       D     01000100     T     01010010     j     01101001     y       E     01000101     U     01010101     k     01101000     z       F     01000101     V     01010101     k     01101101     z       G     01000111     W     010101011     m     01101100     "       H     01001000     X     01011000     N     01101101     #       H     01001001     Y     01011000     n     01101101     #       J     01001001     Z     01011001     O     01101111     %       J     0100101     Z     01011000     R     01100000     %       L     01001010     D     011000010     r     011100001&lt;</td> <td>A     01000001     Q     01010001     g     01100111     w     01110111       B     01000010     R     01010010     h     01101000     x     01110101       C     01000011     S     01010011     i     01101000     y     01111000       D     01000100     T     01010100     j     01101001     y     01111001       E     01000101     U     01010100     k     01101010     z     01111000       F     01000100     V     010101010     k     01101101     i     00100001       G     01000100     X     010101010     I     01101100     i     00100001       F     01000100     X     01011000     n     01101101     #     00100001       G     01001001     Z     01011000     n     01101101     #     00100001       H     01001001     Z     01010001     p     01110000     %     00100101       J     01001010<td>A     01000001     Q     01010001     g     01100111     w     01110111     -       B     01000010     R     01010010     h     01101000     x     01111000     .       C     01000100     T     01010100     j     01101001     x     01111000     .       D     01000100     T     01010100     j     01101010     y     01111000     .       E     01000101     U     01010101     k     01101011     j     01101001     j     01001001     j     01000101     j     001000101     j     001001</td></td>	A     01000001     Q     01010001     g     01100111       B     01000010     R     01010010     h     01101000       C     01000010     T     01010011     i     01101000       D     01000100     T     01010100     j     01101001       E     01000101     U     01010101     k     01101010       F     01000110     V     01010101     k     01101010       G     01000111     W     01010101     I     01101010       H     01001000     X     01011000     m     01101101       H     01001001     Y     01011001     m     01101101       J     01001001     Z     01011001     p     01100101       J     01001010     Z     01010001     r     0110000       K     01001101     b     01100001     r     01110000       M     01001101     c     01100010     r     01110010       M     010	A     01000001     Q     01010001     g     01100111     w       B     01000010     R     01010010     h     01101000     x       C     01000011     S     01010011     i     01101000     x       D     01000100     T     01010010     j     01101001     y       E     01000101     U     01010101     k     01101000     z       F     01000101     V     01010101     k     01101101     z       G     01000111     W     010101011     m     01101100     "       H     01001000     X     01011000     N     01101101     #       H     01001001     Y     01011000     n     01101101     #       J     01001001     Z     01011001     O     01101111     %       J     0100101     Z     01011000     R     01100000     %       L     01001010     D     011000010     r     011100001<	A     01000001     Q     01010001     g     01100111     w     01110111       B     01000010     R     01010010     h     01101000     x     01110101       C     01000011     S     01010011     i     01101000     y     01111000       D     01000100     T     01010100     j     01101001     y     01111001       E     01000101     U     01010100     k     01101010     z     01111000       F     01000100     V     010101010     k     01101101     i     00100001       G     01000100     X     010101010     I     01101100     i     00100001       F     01000100     X     01011000     n     01101101     #     00100001       G     01001001     Z     01011000     n     01101101     #     00100001       H     01001001     Z     01010001     p     01110000     %     00100101       J     01001010 <td>A     01000001     Q     01010001     g     01100111     w     01110111     -       B     01000010     R     01010010     h     01101000     x     01111000     .       C     01000100     T     01010100     j     01101001     x     01111000     .       D     01000100     T     01010100     j     01101010     y     01111000     .       E     01000101     U     01010101     k     01101011     j     01101001     j     01001001     j     01000101     j     001000101     j     001001</td>	A     01000001     Q     01010001     g     01100111     w     01110111     -       B     01000010     R     01010010     h     01101000     x     01111000     .       C     01000100     T     01010100     j     01101001     x     01111000     .       D     01000100     T     01010100     j     01101010     y     01111000     .       E     01000101     U     01010101     k     01101011     j     01101001     j     01001001     j     01000101     j     001000101     j     001001

#### 

What if you were not forced to encode Binary or Hex?








#### **Bound inputs**

- Use of limited characters
- Use of language specific characters
- Number of entry data points
- Forced sequence

What if you were not forced to follow a pattern on data entry? Number, sequence, characters?



acter	Binary Code	Character	Binary						
	01000001	Q	01010001	g	01100111	w	01110111	-	0010
1000	01000010	R	01010010	h	01101000	x	01111000		0010
	01000011	S	01010011	i	01101001	У	01111001	/	0010
-	01000100	Т	01010100	j	01101010	z	01111010	0	0011
<u> 18</u>	01000101	U	01010101	k	01101011	1	00100001	1	0011
-	01000110	V	01010110	1	01101100		00100010	2	0011
i des	01000111/	w	01010111	m	01101101	#	00100011	3	0011
	01001000	X	01011000	n	01101110	\$	00100100	4	0011
	01001001	Y	01011001	0	01101111	%	00100101	5	0011
	01001010	Z	01011010	P	01110000	&	00100110	6	0011
	01001011	а	01100001	q	01110001		00100111	7	0011
1.1	01001100	b	01100010	r	01110010	(	00101000	8	0011
1 3 3	01001101	с	01100011	S	01110011	)	00101001	9	0011
	01001110	d	01100100	t	01110100	*	00101010	?	0011
	01001111	е	01100101	u	01110101	+	00101011	0	0100
	01010000	f	01100110	v	01110110		00101100	-	0101





#### **Compromised data**

- Consolidation of scraped data
- Relating seemingly disparate pieces of data
- Building together the PII puzzle









#### **ATO and Transactional BOT attacks**

#### REPETITION PREDICTABILITY

UNIQUE RANDOMNESS



#### BOUND INPUTS

#### COMPROMISED DATA

UNLIMITED INPUT ZERO PII



#### The ideal MFA solution can't be...

#### **Classic and** new factors


Knowledge Possession Inherence Ability Randomness Location

**SOLUTION** 



Stolen Replicated Shared







#### About written / drawn passwords...

- They are not authenticated as "calligraphy"
- It's not about "pretty" it is all about "can you repeat it"
- Mathematically, nearly impossible to beat.
- Will "trip" a robot trying to replicate.
- Inherently "random", yet "predictable"
- Easier to memorize (eg. Your signature)
- May require mental clarity / focus
- Don't require training. Require proficiency.






## PBNZ

>BNs:1 odds to hack.... Inherently random



#### About written / drawn passwords...




Example 1

Example 2









Example 3

Same "code", but not the same...



#### About written / drawn passwords...




#### It's not about comparing pictures...





#### About written / drawn passwords...



#### It's about how only you can build a math model puzzle that is NOT a coded image...



#### Random Inherent Ability







## "SUN TZU" "On the sun tzu"



}1 y{w

....



## **Thwarting BOT attacks**

Behavioral biometric credentials are a strong deterrent against account takeover (ATO) and transactional BOT attacks because they inject complexity that counter-overwhelms the BOTs

They beat BOTs by NOT playing their game, and being:

- Unique
- Infinite
- Free of personal markers



### UNIQUE RANDOMNESS UNLIMITED INPUT /HR()





#### Protecting your data and identity from BOTs.

SOLUTION

# **Biometric Signature**


#### **Advanced MFA**

#### "Inherence"

#### **BSI's Behavioral Biometrics**



#### **Physical Biometrics Other Techs.**







Palmprint



Veins





Retina

**SOLUTION** 



#### "Knowledge" "Ability" "Possession" 010


**1 1 1** 

Code / Password



Device








#### Passwords that can't be stolen...



- All-at-once Advanced MFA
- Needs no special hardware


- Linked to user's state of mind



PRODUCT




## Has no private identifiable information 192 billion to one link to a human





#### Unique and robust credentials





## MFA requirements.

#### That's it.

**FUNCTIONALITY** 



In one single action, the user meets all

The "challenge screen" is presented to the user at any time validation is required in the process.

Using a finger, mouse or stylus, the user writes their password.








#### Unique and robust credentials





## MFA requirements.

#### That's it.

**FUNCTIONALITY** 





A "signature" instead of a "pin" can also be used for different user experience.

In one single action, the user meets all





 $2x + 4 \, \mathrm{d}x = 3x^3 + x^2 + 4x + C$ 

## MFA credentials that kill BOIS.

$$\tilde{U}(\tau,\omega) = \frac{1}{\Lambda(\tau,\omega)} \exp \left| i \int_{0}^{\tau} \left( \frac{\omega}{\omega_h} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}q(\tau)} \right|^{\frac{1}{2}}$$

 $\beta(\tau,\omega) = \exp\left[-\int_{0}^{\tau} \frac{\omega}{2q(\tau')} \left(\frac{\omega}{\omega_{h}}\right)\right]$ 

 $\Lambda(\tau,\omega) = \frac{\beta(\tau,\omega) + \sigma^2}{\left(\beta(\tau,\omega)\right)^2 + \sigma^2}$ 

